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This paper examines how forest and marine resources serve as insurance against a 
tropical cyclone using original household data gathered in rural Fiji. The fixed-effects 
estimator for a censored dependent variable controls for unobservable household 
heterogeneity that can cause bias. I propose a simple empirical strategy, which can be 
widely applied, to test whether a household intensifies labor activity to earn extra income 
to be shared under private risk-sharing arrangements. I find that while households 
abandon forest product gathering right after the cyclone, value-added handicrafts made of 
some forest products by women serve as self-insurance against crop damage after the 
emergency period and this is especially so among female-headed households. Fijians 
intensify fishing to augment mutual insurance for the recovery from village facility 
damage and housing damages experienced by others. I discuss how this distinct pattern 
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Forest and Sea as Insurance among Fijians 
1.  Introduction  
Do the poor use local natural resources to cope with adverse shocks? This question of 
‘natural insurance’ has received explicit attention among economists since 1980s (e.g., 
Jodha, 1986) and systematic works based on micro survey data recently started to provide 
supportive evidence (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001; Takasaki       , 2004; Fisher and 
Shively, 2005; McSweeney, 2005). Recent theoretical studies highlight advantages of 
commons as insurance: individual returns to resource use vary little across households in 
comparison to asset-dependent activities like farming and the former is often uncorrelated 
with shocks on the latter. For example, Baland and Francois (2005) demonstrate that even 
if the resource is equitably privatized, commons can have better insurance properties than 
insurance markets in the presence of information and enforcement problems. Delacote 
(2007) shows how the insurance role of tropical forests is related to deforestation. The 
natural insurance concept has led to increasing recognition that environmental 
conservation is important for the poor not only for income earnings but also for safety net.  
Using original survey data gathered in Fiji, this paper examines     households 
use natural insurance against a tropical cyclone. This question is of critical importance for 
successful resource management and safety-net policy in small island states whose 
environments are highly vulnerable and economies heavily rely on foreign aid (Bertram, 
1986). Some researchers have criticized the deterioration of islanders’ indigenous 
mechanisms in coping with cyclones due to their increasing dependency on emergency 
aid (e.g., Campbell, 1984). Contrary to extensive anthropological studies, economic 
studies based on household survey data are almost nonexistent in the Pacific region. 
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The paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, distinct from previous 
studies on natural insurance based on cross-section data or random-effects models, I 
follow the theoretical framework of ex post labor supply (Kochar, 1999; Rose, 2001) and 
employ fixed-effects estimators based on panel data. I show that to obtain unbiased 
estimates of a coping response to idiosyncratic shocks which are partially insured by 
private risk sharing, unobservable household heterogeneity needs to be controlled for.  
Second, I address the role of ex post labor supply not only as self-insurance but 
also in mutual insurance (Rosenzweig, 2001 emphasizes the importance of the connection 
of these two). I propose an empirical strategy to test whether a household intensifies its 
labor activity against others’ shocks to augment resources to be shared. On the other hand, 
recent studies shed lights on risk-sharing networks (e.g., Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). I 
examine how ex post labor supply is connected with risk sharing not only within a village 
but also within a kin group in the village in the kin-based Fijian society. 
Third, I compare the roles of natural insurance between forest and marine 
resources. Most previous works focus on wood and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). 
As an exception, Takasaki        (2004) show that Amazonian peasants more commonly 
resort to riverine fishing than NTFP gathering (and hunting) in response to crop loss 
caused by floods. The paper examines both the collection of NTFPs and the sales of 
handicrafts made of NTFPs by women. While the importance of NTFPs among poor 
women is frequently emphasized (e.g., Agarwal, 1990), the insurance role of value-added 
NTFP products often produced by women has received limited attention in the literature.  
Fourth, I examine how distinctively natural insurance works against different 
shocks caused by the cyclone – housing, crop, and village facility damages. Distinct 
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availabilities of cyclone relief corresponding to these shocks in the region make the 
relative importance of risk sharing against them also distinct. When pre-disaster 
information was collected retrospectively as in other post-disaster surveys (e.g., Morris    
   , 2002), with the uniform and easily identified timing of the cyclone, respondents could 
make a clear temporal separation between ex ante and ex post periods. I examine how 
their coping behaviors evolve after the disaster, an unexplored question in the literature. 
The major findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. Distinct from 
previous findings in forest-rich regions and despite rich marine resources in the Pacific, 
Fijians abandon NTFP gathering in the emergency period but augment handicraft selling, 
not fishing, as self-insurance against crop damage, not housing or village damage, after 
the emergency period. Female-headed households do so more strongly than male-headed. 
Fijians intensify fishing against village damage and housing damages experienced by 
others in the same village and kin group. The way they do so depends on the relative 
severity of own and others’ housing damages in the multilayered risk-sharing 
arrangements among villagers and kin-group members. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study area, 
labor activities, and the cyclone. Section 3 discusses the econometric specification 
followed by the estimation results in Section 4. The last section concludes.       
2.  Study area, labor activities, and cyclone 
On January 14, 2003, Cyclone Ami swept over the northern and eastern parts of 
the Fiji Islands. My post-cyclone survey covered nine native Fijian villages on the coast.
1 
                                                 
1 The nine villages were intentionally chosen to cover distinct environmental and 
economic conditions. Six and three villages, respectively, are located on Vanua Levu and 
Taveuni Islands, the second and third largest islands in the country which significantly 
     4
In each village, all households were stratified by the smallest kin group unit defined 
below and the combination of their leadership status and major asset holdings (like shop), 
and in each stratum, households were randomly sampled (n=374). Between late August 
and early November, 2003, one visit to each household in the sample was made and the 
interview asked about its production, income, assets, demographics, cyclone damage, and 
relief (neither consumption nor labor transfer data were collected). Pre-disaster 
information was collected retrospectively. Respondents were asked about the production 
of major crops and the catch of fish in the past one month and then monthly production a 
year before – i.e., before the cyclone – in comparison to the latest figures. NTFP 
gathering, handicraft production, and relief received in each month over the past one year 
were also recorded. Using these two data sets, respectively, I constructed two-period 
panel of pre-cyclone and post-cyclone periods and four-period panel of pre-cyclone 
period 1 (October-December 2002) and post-cyclone periods 2-4 (January-March, April-
June, and July-September 2003) whose descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1 also reports household characteristics a year before the interview as well as 
cyclone damages and both tables compare male- and female headed households. Potential 
measurement errors are discussed in the next section. The paper analyzes 332 households 
with complete data (since kin-group means are used as explanatory variables, all kin 
groups consisting of one household in the sample are dropped).  
The hierarchical kin structure in Fiji is well known. The bottom is extended 
family,         , followed by sub-clan,         , clan,       , and tribe,      . All 
                                                                                                                                                 
lag behind the first largest island Viti Levu where the state capital, two international 
airports, and most tourism businesses are situated. Fiji is divided almost equally into 
native Fijians and Indo-Fijians. This study focuses on the former. 
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native Fijians belong to one tokatoka which belongs to one mataqlai, and so forth 
(Ravuvu, 1983). While vanua extends over several villages, yavusa, mataqali, and 
tokatoka are often formed within a village. The sample includes 15 yavusa, 36 mataqali, 
and 49 tokatoka and their average group sizes are 33, 15, and 10 households, respectively. 
While all nine villages contain more than one mataqali, seven consist of only one yavusa, 
i.e., clan and village coincide with each other. While two vanua range across two villages 
(there are seven vanua in the sample), there is no across-villages overlap of yavusa. Most 
ritual activities like funeral, wedding, and traditional meetings are organized by mataqali 
and yavusa and occasional large meetings are held by vanua. Land and sea tenures are 
determined by kin groups. Rural land is communally owned by mataqali, privately used, 
and is not allowed to be sold by law (communal land consists of about 83% of total land 
in the country). Customary rights for coastal fishing are held by vanua or several yavusa 
often consisting of several villages. The sample includes seven customary fishing areas – 
they do not match with seven vanua – in some of which fishing regulations like the ban 
of Sunday fishing and gill nets exist. 
Almost all households in the sample employ traditional farming practices (using 
no mechanized equipment or animal traction and limited purchased inputs) to mainly 
produce taro, cassava, coconut, and kava plant (a pepper plant, locally known as       , 
used to make a local beverage kava which is a dominant symbol in Fijian culture, Turner, 
1986). None of these crops are seasonal. Most households conduct subsistence fishing 
using lines and hooks, simple spear guns, or rudimentary nets, and more commercially-
oriented fishermen use boats and engine along with more valuable nets. Fishing is less 
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seasonal than forest resource use discussed next.
2 The cropping and fishing incomes a 
year before the interview count for 54% and 29%, respectively, of total income.  
Many dwellers, both men and women, gather forest products like wild fruits for 
consumption and cash earnings. Only women make handicrafts from indigenous plants to 
be used as ceremonial gifts and some craftswomen sell their produce in the local markets 
and small resort hotels for tourists.
3 These NTFPs on communal land are essentially open 
access to all villagers and forest extraction is unregulated. In period 1 – before the 
cyclone – 58% and 12% households, respectively, in six out of nine villages (n=223) 
gathered NTFPs and sold handicrafts but their contributions to total income were 
negligible (in the remaining three villages these two activities were almost nonexistent).  
12% households are headed by female. The female headed have a weaker farming 
capacity – they are older, are less educated, and hold smaller land – than the male headed, 
earning much lower crop income before the cyclone; contrarily, the female headed earned 
greater fishing income (the gendered division of labor is weak in farming and fishing and 
female fishers are known to be active in Fiji, Chapman, 1987) and the gender-disparity in 
total income was not large. While the female headed more commonly sold handicrafts in 
period 1, there is no across-gender difference in sales and NTFP gathering.   
Differing from other islands in the country, the study area is less prone to be hit 
by cyclones and Ami was the only cyclone in the season – it was totally unpredicted by 
                                                 
2 In each village the seasonality of major forest and marine products were asked. 91%, 
17%, and 77% of NTFPs (excluding firewood), finfish species, and other marine products, 
respectively, are seasonal. The contribution of other marine products to income is much 
smaller than finfish.   
3 The three most important handicrafts are famous Fijian mat        made of screw pine, 
                   , finer mat      made of soft sedge,                  , and bark cloth 
     made of paper mulberry,                       .  
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local residents. All nine sample villages were damaged and relief delivery by NGOs and 
the government started only in March.
4 According to the subjective measure of 
respondents, the cyclone damaged 53% residents’ houses – 8% completely destroyed and 
45% partially damaged. 37% of households with housing damaged became refugees. 
They stayed in others’ residence in the same village – permanent migration was 
nonexistent – and about half and two thirds of them, respectively, lived with households 
in the same tokatoka and mataqali. Clearly, kin groups served as a risk-sharing group.  
Labor sharing for emergency housing repair was intensively undertaken among 
males, and as more and more dwellings were repaired, refuges became uncommon. 
Public support for housing rehabilitation was limited to primitive tarpaulins (to be used as 
emergency shelter and for temporary housing repair) and their provision was scarce – 
only 12% households were recipients (by June). More than one year after the cyclone the 
government started to provision construction materials. Hence, how victims could 
rehabilitate their dwellings depends on how much construction materials and labor 
support they could secure in their own ways. At the time of interviews, refugees were 
almost nonexistent, 16 victims built a new house, and 60% damaged dwellings (including 
separate kitchen, shower, and toilet units) were repaired – 65% among the male headed 
vs. 43% among the female headed. In the village-level public rehabilitation programs, 
communal labor – mostly male – also played a main role and at the time of interviews 
most village facilities were not fully rehabilitated due to lack of construction materials. 
                                                 
4 The total cyclone damage across the country (mostly in Vanua Levu and Taveuni) is 
estimated at F$104 million, of which dwelling damage is F$22 million and crop damage 
is F$40 million (F$1 = US$.60) (National Disaster Management Office, 2003). Fourteen 
people were killed. In the sample villages no casualties and very limited injuries and 
illnesses caused by the cyclone were reported.           
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88% households experienced crop damage. I calculated the value of damaged 
crops based on the quantity damaged for each major crop reported by respondents. The 
mean value of damaged crops was about 34 Fiji dollar per adult equivalent (F$1 = 
US$.60), or equivalently 57% mean monthly pre-cyclone crop income. Emergency food 
aid was the largest relief in the region (the total cost of food ration was 20 times that of 
tarpaulins in the country, National Disaster Management Office, 2003). By April almost 
all households got some food aid and in each of the three post-cyclone periods they 
received about 10 days of food per month on average (provisions continued until 
September).
5 That is, an average household could rely on aid to cover about one third of 
its food consumption. Compared to crop damage, this is a huge injection. Based on the 
government estimate of the cost of food ration (F$1.73 per person per day, National 
Disaster Management Office, 2003), the value of 90-days food ration for nine months, 
F$156 per capita, is 4.5 times average crop damage per adult equivalent.  
Distinct from housing and village rehabilitations, households individually 
rehabilitated cropping by collecting harvestable damaged crops, cleaning fields, and 
planting seeds. People planted fast-growing crops (like sweet potato) after their seeds 
were provisioned as part of relief and the harvest already started at the time of interviews. 
Mean crop income was still lower than the pre-cyclone level by 42%. While no gender-
disparity exists in housing damages, the female headed experienced                
                                                 
5 Because the monetary value of food aid received was difficult for respondents to answer, 
interviewers asked the quantity measured in days it would have taken to consume in 
       periods (not actual duration of consumption). Four villages on Vanua Levu 
interviewed from late August through mid-September, earlier than the other five, 
received (almost) no food aid in July or later, but they might receive some after the 
interviews. Table 2 shows food aid in period 4 in the remaining five villages. All four 
villages interviewed late are included in the six main handicraft villages.  
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greater crop damage than the male headed – 54% vs. 101% of monthly pre-cyclone crop 
income. Nevertheless, the relative gender-disparity in crop income did not increase over 
the past one year, indicating that the female headed more rehabilitated cropping than the 
male headed.  
In period 2 right after the cyclone, households abandoned NTFP gathering. Most 
NTFPs are seasonal but seasonality only partly explains this pattern (see note 2). The 
deteriorated access to gathering sites due to downed trees and debris precluded 
households from doing this activity in some locations but not all. The most likely reason 
for this abandonment is to free labor for other coping activities under emergency. Indeed, 
gathering recovered in periods 3 and 4 but participation was still much lower than the 
pre-cyclone level. Participation in and revenues from handicraft selling also did not 
change much in period 2 but greatly increased later. This pattern matches with the 
recovery of tourists’ demand. Main handicraft NTFPs are not seasonal.    
The female headed more commonly participated in handicraft selling and sold 
more than the male headed in period 4. Among the female headed, the sales amount was 
16 times that in period 1 and the income share of handicrafts reached 19% in the whole 
female head sample. On the other hand, in comparison to the pre-cyclone level fishing 
income significantly decreased especially among the female headed and as a result its 
gender-disparity disappeared. Damages on fishing capital which could cause this pattern 
were not common. Households, especially the female headed, shifted labor from risky 
fishing to less risky handicraft selling; they did not intensify NTFP gathering probably 
because of its lower returns to labor (with lack of time allocation information, I cannot 
compare returns to labor across activities).   
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These findings give initial evidence that handicraft selling in periods 3 and 4 – 
especially among the female headed in period 4 – served as self-insurance but NTFP 
gathering and fishing did not. Other potential coping activities than private transfers and 
informal loans must have played minor roles. Casual wage labor, a focus of previous 
works on ex post labor supply, was very rare and its contribution to total income was 
negligible. Livestock selling contributed little to income earnings. The disposition of 
fishing capital and the transfer of usufruct of land to smooth consumption after the 
cyclone was nonexistent. Indeed, fishing capital and land holdings did not change in the 
past one year almost at all. Formal credits and insurance were nonexistent.   
3.  Econometric specification 
Numerous works have tested the full-risk sharing hypothesis using the equation  
                                  2 1 0       ,               
where  ,  , and   stand for household, village, and time, respectively,     is household 
consumption,     and    , respectively, are household- and village-level adverse shocks,    
is unobservable household heterogeneity, and     is a time-variant error term which is 
individually and independently distributed (e.g., Townsend, 1994). The null hypothesis of 
full risk sharing among households is that individual consumption is unaltered by 
idiosyncratic shock as they efficiently share available resources which are only altered by 
covariate shock, i.e.,    = 0 and    < 0. As unobservable welfare weights used in the risk 
sharing are correlated with idiosyncratic shock, to eliminate    using fixed-effects models 
is needed to obtain unbiased estimates. The full-risk sharing model has been extended to 
examine risk sharing within other group than village such as cast (Morduch, 2005) and 
household network (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006): 
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                                         3 2 1 0         ,             
where     is a covariate shock in group  . If risk is shared at the village level not group, 
the addition of the group shock is redundant as the village shock is already controlled for; 
its significant impact on consumption means that risk is shared among group members. 
Rose (2001) offers a theoretical framework for household labor supply decisions 
in response to a covariate shock on own farm production (regional rainfall). Adding an 
idiosyncratic shock to her model gives rise to the ex post labor supply equation 
                       , 
where   and  , respectively, are idiosyncratic and covariate shocks as before, and   and 
 , respectively, are household- and village-level factors which affect returns to labor like 
productive assets and market prices. The standard income effect suggests that with 
greater adverse shocks, income is lower and the household will increase labor supply to 
smooth income (Rose, 2001): that is,   ,    > 0 in the estimating equation  
                                                5 4 2 1 0           .       (1)   
As in the full-risk sharing model, the model (1) can be extended to 
                                                       5 4 3 2 1 0             .    (2)   
In the case of sub-groups within the village, impacts of the covariate shock measured at 
the village level in (1) are decomposed into those at the group and village levels in (2).   
Ex post labor supply and risk sharing are related with each other. On one hand, 
risk sharing lowers the demand for income smoothing through labor activities. With full 
risk sharing (   = 0), labor supply is unresponsive to idiosyncratic shock (   = 0) while 
uninsured covariate shock still matters. On the other hand, additional labor income 
augments resources to be shared. As the full-risk sharing model captures consumption 
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smoothing against idiosyncratic shock       households earn ex post labor income, the 
reduced-form models (1) and (2) capture household labor response to idiosyncratic shock 
      it is weakened by risk sharing. Hence, in the models (1) and (2), unobservable 
welfare weights used in the risk sharing affect household labor supply decisions and any 
partly insured idiosyncratic shocks (like illness) are endogenous. Unless researchers 
focus on covariate shock, they need to control for household heterogeneity    using fixed-
effects estimators. Random-effects estimates are unbiased on the assumption that ex post 
labor supply is unrelated with risk sharing, which is too restrictive.  
Although to develop a theory combining the household labor supply model and 
the full risk-sharing model is beyond the scope of the paper, I empirically explore the 
resource-augmentation effect. Suppose that in the model (1) the idiosyncratic shock is a 
dummy variable which perfectly distinguishes recipients and donors in the risk-sharing 
arrangement among villagers, and the village-level covariate shock is measured by the 
village mean of this dummy (a standard procedure in the literature on risk sharing). I run 
the reduced-form regressions among households with and without the idiosyncratic shock 
– recipients and donors – separately maintaining the village-level covariate shock 
measured in the whole sample. Then, the positive coefficient for the covariate shock in 
the donor sample shows how much donors augment labor supply against the shocks 
experienced by others in the same village. To extend this sub-sample analysis to the 
model (2) with the group mean is analogous.    
I examine two idiosyncratic shocks caused by the cyclone, housing damage 
captured by two dummies, one for partial damage and another for complete damage, and 
crop damage captured by the value of crop damage per adult equivalent (log). Apart from 
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the aforementioned risk-sharing effect, household crop damage is endogenous because 
unobservable household and village characteristics such as land quality, farming skills, 
market conditions, environmental conditions (e.g., resource stock), and institutions (e.g., 
resource use regulations) affect pre-cyclone cropping decisions which determine crop 
damage. Housing damage should be much more exogenous. Indeed, households with and 
without housing damaged do not significantly differ from each other in their pre-cyclone 
income, asset holdings, and household characteristics (results are not shown), indicating 
the randomness of housing damage. Housing damage can be related with unobservable 
initial housing characteristics which might be somewhat correlated with unobservable 
determinants of labor supply though. In the Fijian panel data, most of these unobservable 
factors – including pre-cyclone cropping decisions and potential ex ante risk-management 
behaviors – are fixed effects which can be controlled for by fixed-effects estimators. 
Although all household-level factors determining production technology like productive 
assets (   ) are also fixed effects, they may influence household labor responses to the 
shocks as they alter returns to labor. This issue is examined in the next section.  
In all models a time dummy captures common events or trend including 
seasonality. I consider two specifications for village-level time-variant factors. The first 
uses village-time dummies which capture all village-level factors including unobservable 
ones like market prices of various products. The second specification focuses on 
observable village-level factors – the village means of the three idiosyncratic shocks 
discussed above, the village mean of food aid per month (log), the proportion of 
households receiving tarpaulins in the village, and a dummy for damages on main village 
facilities (school, health center, and church). The relief variables measured in periods 2 
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and 3 – period 4 is not included for the reason given in note 5 – capture cyclone relief as 
positive shocks. Relief received by individual households is not included because it is 
endogenously determined as part of private risk sharing (Dercon and Krishnan, 2005).  
With only nine villages in the sample, interpretations of estimation results of these 
village-level variables need caution – better analysis requires a much larger number of 
villages with richer spatial coverage (ideally including villages with no cyclone damage).  
In the model (2) I examine tokatoka and mataqali as a potential risk-sharing group 
within the village by using the group means of the three idiosyncratic shocks as group-
level covariate shocks (as discussed above, yavusa is almost the same as village and most 
vanua and customary fishing areas are larger than village). With the relatively large 
numbers of these groups, estimated standard errors are clustered by the groups. The 
group and village mean estimates should be accurate because on average about 70% 
households were sampled in each stratum defined by tokatoka.  
Household labor response to the mean damage can be either for self-insurance 
against uninsured covariate shock and for mutual insurance to help others, or both. I 
conjecture that the sharp contrast between food aid and housing support in their 
availabilities makes informal risk sharing against housing damage play a much more 
important role than that against crop damage, and as a result housing damage mostly 
distinguishes net recipients and donors not only of labor transfer for repairing but also of 
non-labor sharing to help victims purchase construction materials. Households are 
divided almost equally into those with and without housing damaged, making such risk 
sharing possible. Then, the sub-sample analysis for households without housing damaged 
mainly captures the resource-augmentation effect of ex post labor supply. Importantly, as 
     15
housing damage is exogenous, potential selection bias is not a concern. The sign of the 
estimated coefficients for relief should be opposite to damages because public transfer 
augments resources to be shared as a favorable covariate shock. A positive estimated 
coefficient for village facility damage indicates that the household augments labor supply 
to make contributions to the village for rehabilitation. 
Non-participation common in NTFP-based activities is an econometric challenge. 
I employ the trimmed least squares estimator developed by Honoré (1992) to control for 
unobservable household heterogeneity    with a censored dependent variable. Another 
advantage of this fixed-effects model is that it is robust to heteroskedasticity and non-
normality which are other potential sources of bias in random-effects Tobit estimates. 
This estimator has not been used in previous works on ex post labor supply. I use the 
first-difference estimator for fishing the participation of which is almost universal.   
With lack of time allocation information, I use revenues as a proxy for labor input. 
Market prices which determine revenues are controlled for by village-time dummies in 
the first specification (the second specification is discussed below). The fixed-effects 
estimator controls for any systematic difference between revenues and labor input caused 
by unobservable skills, fishing capital (which changed little over time), and resource 
stocks (labor is an effectively unique input for NTFP-based activities). Since the overall 
significance of estimation results for non-handicraft NTFP gathering is shown to be very 
weak due to its uncommon participation and small revenues especially after the cyclone, 
the analysis focuses on handicraft selling as a major form of forest resource use.  
To examine the evolution of ex post handicraft responses, I conduct two-period 
analysis for periods 1 and 2, periods 1 and 3, and periods 1 and 4 separately. In the latter 
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two, labor input in period 3 or 4 is connected with the shocks experienced in period 2 and 
periods 2 and 3 or periods 2-4 are treated as one post-cyclone period. This is a standard 
practice in analyzing annual survey data lacking information over time within the year. 
Two potential problems arise. First, coping behaviors in the previous post-cyclone 
period(s) correlated with shocks may affect decisions in the subsequent period as an 
‘unobservable’ time-variant factor. Second, measurement errors in the timing of 
production in the original monthly data may be systematically correlated with 
idiosyncratic shocks. I ran the same regressions using monthly revenues calculated over 
periods 2 and 3 and periods 2-4 as a dependent variable in the post-cyclone period. 
Results were very similar to what are presented here. I also employ the 2-period model 
for fishing, the ex post data of which is at the time of interviews.  
Measurement errors in the retrospective data require particular attention. First of 
all, measurement errors in the two housing damage dummies are minimal because the 
same categories were used by relief officers for their damage assessments. All village 
leaders could well recall the total number of damaged houses, that is, the damage status 
of each dwelling was well known among villagers. On the other hand, measurement 
errors in the value of crop damage can be considerable and systematic. I repeated all 
analyses using a dummy for the incidence of crop damage, the errors of which should be 
minimal. Qualitatively the same results were found (results are not shown).   
The evolution of production found in the descriptive statistics may be caused by 
respondents’ memory loss in early periods. Such memory loss should be small in 
participation because the very minor activity of NTFP gathering was much less common 
in periods 3 and 4 than 1. While respondents could well recall the production of 
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handicrafts with significant cultural and social importance (they serve as major 
ceremonial goods in kava ritual, Turner, 1987), revenues may contain significant 
measurement errors. While common memory loss is controlled for by the time dummy, 
the correlation of errors in revenues, especially before the cyclone, with idiosyncratic 
shocks causes bias. There is no way to control for this potential bias. The positive 
(negative) correlation – households with larger idiosyncratic shocks tend to report higher 
(lower) pre-cyclone revenues than the real – causes upward (downward) bias. Thus, 
unless the correlation is positive and large, estimated positive    is qualitatively robust.      
4.  Estimation results 
The first-difference estimates of determinants of log fishing revenues per adult 
equivalent per month are reported in Table 3. All results of the model (2) are based on 
tokatoka. The first four columns show results for the whole sample. When time-variant 
village-level factors are fully controlled for by village-time dummies (Column 1), 
households intensify fishing against own crop damage not housing damage. When 
village-time dummies are replaced with observable village-level variables (Column 2), 
the estimated coefficients for household-level shocks do not change almost at all, 
indicating that unobservable village-level time-variant factors do not cause bias. 
Households strongly adjust fishing to village-level factors. While partial housing damage 
at the village level exhibits no impacts, households in a village with main facilities 
damaged and with more houses completely damaged in proportion fish more – the former 
marginal effect is 25% and the latter is 6.8% for a 1% increase in the proportion of 
victims in the village (equivalently about 12.6% for an additional victim in an average 
village with 54 households). Households in a village with more tarpaulins in proportion 
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fish less and the marginal effect in magnitude is about half of that of the complete 
housing damage. While crop damage at the village level exhibits no significant impact, 
households in a village with more food aid fish less (8.8% reduction for a 10% increase 
in food aid). Although these estimates require caution as discussed above, they are quite 
consistent with the predictions.  
When the three group-level shock variables are added to the model with village-
time dummies (Column 3), the estimated coefficients for two individual housing damage 
variables increase in magnitude – neither of them is still statistically significant – and 
crop damage loses its statistical significance, indicating that the omission of group-level 
shock variables causes bias. Indeed, households in a kin group with more complete 
housing damages intensify fishing – the marginal effect is 1% for a 1 % increase in the 
proportion of victims in the same group (equivalently about 10% for an additional victim 
in an average tokatoka with 10 member households). The partial housing damage and 
crop damage at the group level exhibit no significant impacts. 
When observable village-level variables are used (Column 4), the estimated 
coefficients for household- and group-level variables do not change almost at all and 
those for the village-level variables are very similar to Column (2). The only exception is 
that the estimated coefficient for the village-level complete housing damage decreases by 
11% or equivalently by almost the same magnitude of the impact of the group-level 
complete housing damage. This indicates that households more strongly respond to the 
village-level complete damage than the group-level damage.     
Disaggregated results for households without and with housing damaged are 
reported in Columns (5)-(8). Further disaggregated results for those with housing 
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partially damaged which consist of 85% victims (Columns 9 and 10) are almost the same 
as those for all victims (to separately analyze the remaining 28 households with housing 
completely damaged is infeasible). As results are almost the same between models with 
village-time dummies and with observable village-level variables, only the latter are 
reported. First of all, victims intensify fishing to earn extra income to help make 
contributions to the village for rehabilitation; non-victims do not need to do so. While 
impacts of village-level complete housing damage and food aid are similar between non-
victims and victims, group-level complete housing damage only influences non-victims 
and partial damage positively and negatively affects non-victims and victims, 
respectively. These findings suggest multilayered risk-sharing patterns: at the village 
level, recipients are households with housing completely damaged and donors are those 
with housing undamaged and partially damaged; at the kin group level, recipients are 
both of these two victims and donors are non-victims.  
Households with housing partially damaged thus play dual roles: on one hand, 
they decrease fishing against group-level partial housing damage as they rely on help 
offered by non-victims in the same group; on the other hand, they intensify fishing to 
help others with severer damage in the same village as non-victims do. Since complete 
housing damage is relatively uncommon and nonexistent in some kin groups and the 
magnitude of this shock is too large to be shared among kin members, the larger-scale 
risk sharing at the village level plays a main role. Indeed, non-victims’ fishing response 
to village-level complete housing damage is much stronger than that to group-level. Also 
only victims are affected by tarpaulin, indicating the larger role played by non-victims as 
donors than victims with partial damage. On the other hand, partial housing damage is 
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much more common and occurs in most kin groups and the moderate magnitude of this 
shock can be shared within the group. Indeed, non-victims’ fishing response to village-
level partial housing damage is even negative. The models with mataqali-level shock 
variables generate very similar results. Hence, the resource-augmentation effect of ex 
post fishing exists mostly within tokatoka (a sub-group of mataqali).  
Are the resource-augmentation effects found a robust result? Regarding the 
village-level effect captured by observable village-level shocks, it depends on whether 
they are correlated with unobservable time-variant covariate factors. Fishing competition 
and fish prices are potentially important. Fishing competition in the customary fishing 
area occurs among all villagers not among tokatoka or mataqali members and fish prices 
mostly follow three local markets depending on village location. If victims lower fishing 
efforts to free labor for rehabilitation, the competition among fishers will decrease and 
the reduced supply of fish may boost fish prices in comparison to other products, thereby 
encouraging fishing among non-victims. That is, housing damages may be negatively and 
positively correlated with unobserved competitions and relative prices, respectively. If 
competition or price actually mattered, non-victims’ responses to village-level housing 
damages should be stronger than victims’; however, the converse holds true for partial 
damage and their responses to complete damage are very similar to each. Of course, 
possibilities of other confounding effects cannot be ruled out.
6 On the other hand, 
unobservable village-level factors do not cause bias in the estimates of household 
responses to kin-group shocks, because the results are almost the same between the 
                                                 
6 For example, village-level housing damage (especially complete damage) may be 
correlated with damages on infrastructure that affected the transport of produce to local 
markets, but most damaged roads were recovered at the time of interviews. Institutional 
change could matter, but no fishing regulations were altered after the cyclone. 
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models with observable village-level shocks and with village-time dummies. Hence, the 
resource-augmentation effect at the kin-group level is likely to be robust.  
I consider two fixed effects which can make household ex post labor responses 
heterogeneous – fishing capital and gender. As fishing capital determines returns to labor, 
the role of fishing as self-insurance may be asset-dependent. As in other developing 
regions, share fishing is relatively common in the study area: households that are poor in 
fishing capital work with others with large holdings in exchange for a share of the catch. 
Then, the resource-augmentation effect may depend on group members’ capital holdings 
(if share fishing is done among them). In addition, although inequalities are often 
considered to be an important determinant of the use of commons and mixed results on 
their effects are found (e.g., Baland and Platteau, 1997; Alix-Garcia, 2008), how they 
influence the insurance role of commons has not been examined in the literature. I add 
individual shock variables interacted with individual capital holdings per adult equivalent 
(log) to the models (1) and (2) and group-level shock variables interacted with their group 
means and coefficient variations (standard deviations divided by means) to the model (2). 
No significant results on these interaction terms are found (results are not shown). As 
discussed above, household characteristics are distinct in the gender sphere and the sharp 
gendered division of labor exists in handicraft making (women) and labor sharing (men). 
I add individual shock variables interacted with a dummy for female head except 
complete housing damage which was experienced by a limited number of the female 
headed. I find no significant results (results are not shown).  
Trimmed least squared estimates for log handicraft sales per adult equivalent per 
month – in six main participant villages – are reported in Table 4. The models with 
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village-time dummies – with and without interaction terms with the female head dummy 
– are shown. As all results with tokatoka- and mataqali-level shocks are very similar to 
each other, only the former are reported. While the overall fitness of the models is not 
strong in periods 1 and 2, households with more crop damage sell more handicrafts in 
period 3 with no gendered difference (the interaction term is insignificant) and the female 
headed also do so in period 4 (only the interaction term is significant). Without 
interaction terms, crop damage is insignificant in period 4: that is, ignoring the gendered 
heterogeneity fails to capture the strong coping response of the female headed. With no a 
priori reason for the across-gender disparity in recall bias, this gendered difference is very 
unlikely to be a biased result. No kin-group shocks exhibit significant results in a robust 
manner. When observable village-level variables are used, almost none of them are 
significant and all other results are almost the same as what are presented here.
7  
I argue that these distinct patterns between handicraft selling and fishing are 
caused by households’ private adjustments to cyclone relief. With generous food aid, the 
demand for self-insurance against crop damage is not high but households still need extra 
cash. Although there are significant variations in crop damages among households, 
information problems constrain risk sharing (crop rehabilitation involves no sharing). 
Handicraft selling is attractive self-insurance because it is low-risk-low-return but more 
value-added than NTFP gathering and it can be done individually by women when males 
are overwhelmed by labor-sharing tasks. However, handicrafts do not serve as insurance 
under emergency; mutual insurance probably plays a central role as exemplified by co-
                                                 
7 I ran the same regressions among households with housing damaged, finding similar 
results to those for the whole sample. It was infeasible to analyze the non-victim sample 
because of the small number of observations and the uncommon participation after the 
cyclone in some villages. 
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residence for refugees. The demand for handicraft selling as insurance becomes high 
when they are waiting for the harvest of rehabilitated crops in the lean period 3. To 
compensate for the proportionally greater crop damage than the male headed, the female 
headed boost production in period 4 when their labor constraint becomes less tight.   
With very limited public support for housing rehabilitation, victims seek large 
extra cash to purchase construction materials (and tarpaulins) as well as labor support for 
repair. Most victims rely on mutual insurance supported by non-victims as potential 
donors. Lack of information problems and randomness in housing damage facilitate risk 
sharing. Fishing is too risky for self-insurance even among large fishing capital holders. 
Although cyclone relief – both tarpaulins and food aid – is of great help, it is not 
sufficient for victims. To augment risk sharing donors exploit rich marine resources to 
earn extra cash at least at the time of interviews – whether they also did so earlier is 
unknown. This augmentation is not affected by capital holdings among risk-sharing 
members. Lastly, with limited public support for village rehabilitation, households make 
significant contributions and fishing helps those with housing damaged do so.  
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examined how forest and marine resources serve as insurance against a 
tropical cyclone using original household data gathered in rural Fiji. The fixed-effects 
estimator for a censored dependent variable controlled for unobservable household 
heterogeneity that could cause bias. I proposed a simple empirical strategy, which can be 
widely applied, to test whether a household intensifies labor activity to earn extra income 
to be shared under private risk-sharing arrangements. I found that while households 
abandon forest product gathering right after the cyclone, value-added handicrafts made of 
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some forest products by women serve as self-insurance against crop damage after the 
emergency period and this is especially so among female-headed households who 
experienced proportionally greater damage than male-headed. Fijians intensify fishing to 
augment mutual insurance for the recovery from village facility damage and housing 
damages experienced by others (six to nine months after the cyclone). The risk-sharing 
arrangements are multilayered: not only households without housing damaged fish more 
to help others with severe damage in the same village and others with severe and less 
severe damage in the same kin group within the village, but also households with less 
severe damage do so to help others with severe damage in the same village. I discussed 
how the distinct patterns of natural insurance across resources and shocks emerged as 
private adjustments to cyclone relief delivered to the region over time. 
These findings are context-specific but they still lead to the following general 
policy implications. First, with value-adding process natural insurance may play a 
significant role even in resource-poor environments. In some locales like Fiji 
development of handicraft enterprises and markets is probably promising for both income 
enhancement and better safety nets especially among poor women. Second, focusing on 
the self-insurance role of nature may lead to incomplete or wrong understanding of its 
broader role because it can be tightly linked with mutual insurance. This indicates the 
importance of integrating community-based resource management and safety-net policy. 
For example, such an approach helps avoid local overexploitation of commons under 
pressure, potential pitfall of natural insurance. In Fiji, however, kin groups which 
determine land and sea tenures do not necessarily match with risk-sharing groups. 
Coordinated managements of forest and marine resources are surely needed but in 
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practice they are quite separated as in other locales. Third, right after the disaster, people 
do not resort to forest – with or without value-adding process – probably because mutual 
insurance plays a greater role under emergency (the insurance role of sea at that time is 
unknown though). While emergency relief is of great help, policy makers need to note 
that it may significantly alter informal mechanisms as recipients make adjustments.  
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Sectoral income per adult equivalent per month a year ago - pre-cyclone (F$):
Cropping 60.2 (90.8) 64.5 (95.2) 28.5 (35.0) 0.019
Fishing 32.1 (44.8) 30.4 (30.7) 44.9 (28.1) 0.054
NTFP gathering and handicraft sellinga 1.2 (3.6) 1.2 (1.2) 1.0 (1.1) 0.744
Permanent wage labora 10.7 (41.8) 11.5 (11.4) 4.4 (5.0) 0.311
Casula wage labora 0.5 (3.2) 0.4 (0.4) 1.1 (0.7) 0.201
Otherb 6.9 (44.5) 7.1 (7.1) 5.6 (6.4) 0.841
Total 112 (118) 115 (115) 85.5 (73.8) 0.136
Current sectoral income per adult equivalent per month - post-cyclone (F$):
Cropping 34.9 (59.6) 37.3 (37.1) 17.3 (19.8) 0.047
Fishing 21.6 (33.6) 21.9 (22.0) 18.7 (19.7) 0.571
NTFP gathering and handicraft selling
a 3.2 (10.6) 2.2 (2.1) 10.7 (9.8) 0.000
Permanent wage labor
a 10.1 (40.9) 10.9 (10.8) 4.5 (5.1) 0.351
Casula wage labora 0.9 (5.4) 0.8 (0.8) 1.2 (0.6) 0.665
Otherb 3.0 (12.3) 2.7 (2.8) 5.0 (5.7) 0.282
Total 73.7 (83.2) 75.9 (75.8) 57.5 (60.8) 0.189
Household characteristics a year ago - pre-cyclone:
Land per adult equivalent (acre) 1.1 (1.5) 1.2 (5.0) 0.6 (2.5) 0.013
Fishing capital per adult equivalent (F$) 107 (423) 98 (444) 174 (638) 0.290
Adults' secondary education dummy 0.83 (0.37) 0.85 (0.86) 0.70 (0.74) 0.015
Household size (adult equivalent) 4.9 (2.2) 4.9 (4.9) 4.4 (4.6) 0.126
Age of household head 48.6 (13.9) 47.0 (47.0) 59.5 (60.0) 0.000
Female head dummy 0.12 (0.33) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (1.00) n.a.
Cyclone damages:
Housing damaged dummy 0.53 (0.50) 0.53 (0.53) 0.53 (0.51) 0.913
Housing partially damaged dummy 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.44) 0.45 (0.49) 0.987
Housing completely damaged dummy 0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.09) 0.08 (0.03) 0.821
0.37 (0.48) 0.37 (0.37) 0.43 (0.39) 0.574
Crop damaged dummy 0.86 (0.35) 0.87 (0.87) 0.78 (0.89) 0.107
Crop damage per adult equivalent (F$) 34.4 (44.7) 35.1 (35.0) 28.7 (32.8) 0.396
Housing rehabilitation (among households with housing damaged):
Complete dwelling repair dummy 0.59 (0.49) 0.65 (0.65) 0.43 (0.46) 0.027
New housing construction dummy 0.09 (0.29) 0.06 (0.06) 0.03 (0.03) 0.349
No. observations 332 292 40
a Pre-cyclone and pos-cyclone sectoral incomes are for periods 1 and 4, respectively. 
b Other income consists of shop profit, livestock selling, and other self-employment activities like 
middleman.
Note: Household means are shown along with standard deviations in parentheses. t-test and chi-squared 
tests compare the means and proportion for continuous and dummy variables, respectively. Test results 
are italicized and those with a 5% significance level are bolded. 
All Male head Female head
Proportion of refugees right after the 
cyclone (among households with 
housing damaged)




Table 2. Household NTFP gathering, handicraft sales, and cyclone relief.
NTFP gaterhing (in six main participant villages, n=223):
Participation
All 0.58 (0.49) 0.00 (0.07) 0.11 (0.32) 0.22 (0.41)
Male head 0.59 (0.49) 0.01 (0.07) 0.10 (0.30) 0.21 (0.41)
Female head 0.55 (0.51) 0.00 (0.00) 0.19 (0.40) 0.26 (0.44)
Proportion test (p-value) 0.116 0.652 0.288 0.893
Revenues per adult equivalent per month (F$)
All 0.81 (2.72) 0.00 (0.00) 0.29 (1.20) 0.81 (3.48)
Male head 0.88 (2.89) 0.00 (0.00) 0.26 (1.23) 0.88 (3.72)
Female head 0.35 (1.11) 0.00 (0.00) 0.47 (1.03) 0.40 (1.15)
Mean test (p-value) 0.162 0.655 0.568 0.372
Handicraft sales (in six main participant villages, n=223):
Participation
All 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.19 (0.39) 0.22 (0.42)
Male head 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.18 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40)
Female head 0.19 (0.40) 0.16 (0.37) 0.23 (0.43) 0.39 (0.50)
Proportion test (p-value) 0.064 0.182 0.329 0.083
Revenues per adult equivalent per month (F$)
All 0.73 (3.29) 0.53 (2.34) 1.23 (3.87) 3.86 (12.2)
Male head 0.72 (3.47) 0.53 (2.47) 1.26 (3.97) 2.31 (7.39)
Female head 0.83 (1.80) 0.55 (1.35) 1.03 (3.26) 13.5 (25.5)
Mean test (p-value) 0.378 0.608 0.799 0.000
Cyclone relief (whole sample, n=332):
Tarpaulin receipt dummy 0.08 (0.27) 0.04 (0.19) 0.00 (0.00)
Food aid receipt dummy
a 0.77 (0.42) 0.79 (0.41) 0.70 (0.46)
Food aid per month (days)a 9.6 (8.5) 9.5 (8.1) 9.9 (10.1)
a For period 4, the mean in five villages excluding other four in which interviews were conducted late 
period 4 are shown. 
Note - Household means are shown along with standard deviations in parentheses. t-test and chi-
squared tests compare the means and proportion for continuous and dummy variables, respectively. Test 
results are italicized and those with a 5% significance level are bolded. 
Pre-cyclone Post-cyclone
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
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